Product Description

Acclaimed historian Antony Beevor vividly brings to life the epic struggles that took place in Second World War Crete

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #5986 in Books
• Published on: 2005-09-12
• Original language: English
• Binding: Paperback
• 400 pages

Features

• New
• Mint Condition
• Dispatch same day for order received before 12 noon
• Guaranteed packaging
• No quibbles returns

Review
‘Antony Beevor’s unerring flair for the climate and the feel of the conflict ... his insight and his grasp of these vents make them seem as though they had happened last week’ (Patrick Leigh Fermor, Daily Telegraph )

'Excellent... an arresting account of the whole war on Crete, including the ghastly experiences of the Cretans under German occupation' (John Keegan, Sunday Telegraph )

'The best book we have got on Crete' (Michael Foot, Observer )

'Beevor's account is excellent: fresh, lively and peppered with anecdotes' (Mail on Sunday )

‘A new paperback edition is welcome for two reasons; reminding us that Beevor is a writer and historian of rare ability and for starkly illustrating the variables of war’

Mail on Sunday
'Beevor's account is excellent: fresh, lively and peppered with anecdotes'

John Keegan, Sunday Telegraph
'Excellent... an arresting account of the whole war on Crete, including the ghastly experiences of the Cretans under German occupation'

Customer Reviews

Clarity brought to a Complex Story
This is a splendidly-written account of the British Campaign in Greece and Crete in 1941, and to a lesser extent, of the resistance to the Germans during the occupation. The account of the defence against the German airborne invasion is masterly, and though many units are involved, the writer has the knack of keeping them distinct in the reader's mind such that there is no difficulty in following the actions at four separate but simultaneous landing points. Stories of heroism and of initiative, and also sadly of failure of will, abound on all sides. The aspect of the knife-edge that separated success and failure is very well conveyed. Bernard Freyberg emerges as a tragic figure, a man of magnificent personal courage and a Homeric hero of an earlier war, and in the same general theatre, but sadly out of his depth in the Cretan operation. One is reminded poignantly of the merciless revelation of John Bell Hood's weakness as a commander during his invasion of Tennessee in late 1864. The only fault I found with the Resistance part of the book was that it was too short, and I would have enjoyed a more extended account of individual actions. Inspired by this, I am now keen to locate "The Cretan Runner", so favourably mentioned by the author. Given the prominent role played in the Resistance story by Patrick Leigh-Fermor, those who enjoy this book will be entranced by his two books detailing a foot journey he made as a youth from Hook of Holland to Istanbul in 1934. In Crete, he and small band of heroes, British, Commonwealth and Greek, faced terrifying consequences for any failure when they faced a ruthless and merciless foe. This book underlines how high was the price paid for freedom in the 1940's, and how dreadful were the consequences of disarmament and pacifism in the democracies in the two previous decades - a lesson we forget at our peril.

He has produced better...
I am a big fan of Antony Beevor, enjoying every book that I have read by him. However, this account of the invasion and resistance on Crete during WW2 falls a bit short compared to his epic works on Berlin and the Spanish Civil War.
The best thing about this work is that it does flow well and is written in a very readable style, so you don't get bogged down and I believe it gives a good overview with what was going on from beginning to end.
There are quite a few things which would improve it though. There are not enough maps for a start and the work is so skewed towards a British viewpoint that I would have loved to have found out a bit more about the Cretans and the Germans. The Italians hardly get a mention so I really have no idea what they did on the island ( maybe nothing?! ). Whilst I think the story of the invasion is covered pretty well, covering parallel actions in different areas the occupation/resistance seems a bit bitty. We hear too much about some SOE agents, but only tantalising titbits about others, or about other soldiers left behind after Crete fell, for instance the handy trio of Australians that crop up every now and again...I am assuming they must have had a good story to tell but they are not even named!
One other item that I feel would be really interesting is covering what happened to some of the characters after their involvement in Crete came to an end...what happened to Captain Forrester after he led that amazing charge of Cretan men, women and children!
Don't get me wrong, I did enjoy this book but feel it could have been a lot better.

May I opine?
In considering Crete, and its defence, as an expatriate New Zealander now living in Blighty, I really do feel someone must speak up for the ANZACs.

The defence of Crete was led by New Zealand's Lt Gen Bernhard Freyberg VC, with NZ and Australian soldiers, and British soldiers, e.g. the Black Watch and late arrivals the RM Commandos (whose numbers included Evelyn Waugh). Naturally there were also plenty of Greek Army and Cretan defenders (and Cretan partisans who the Nazis dealt with especially severely).

Beevor's criticisms of Freyberg and subordinates are harsh, and admittedly to an extent warranted - but only to an extent. He also neglects to mention that Freyberg went on to become one of the best Divisional Commanders of WWII. Essentially Freyberg was given mere days to prepare for this onslaught of the Nazi war machine - he and his men had just landed on Crete after a fighting withdrawal from the Greek mainland. They were hardly "fresh" and Crete was hardly a fortress. Freyberg was not allowed to dynamite Maleme Airfield as he wanted to - the one act that might have guaranteed victory. He had hardly any planes - indeed the RAF was forced to depart soon after hostilities began, he had only a very few obsolete tanks and not much artillery, and almost no radios. In his excoriation of Freyberg, Beevor just doesn't seem to "get" a lot of these simple undeniable facts.

Admittedly, there is no denying that maddening mistakes were made. EG: Freyberg did misread Ultra, and seemingly gave too great an emphasis to the threat of seaborne invasion - although it must not be forgotten that the Nazis DID try that route. And, for want of reinforcements (that appalling idiot Hargest), the NZders didn't counter-attack til it was too late, and so ended up conceding Maleme airfield.

But for goodness sake, ordinary Kiwi blokes in khaki with a few rounds of ammo were doing bayonet charges with .303 bolt action Enfield riles against fanatical Falschirmjager armed with Schmeisser submachine guns and weaponry unavailable to the defenders. The German Paratroopers were the cream of Nazi soldiery and society, treated to the best of everything the Nazis had; Blucher's grandson was one of their number, and every officer seemed to be a "von" of some sort. As often as not, the scruffy Kiwi jokers gave the Nazi aristos a bloody nose.

No. The real reason the Germans won at Crete, was because Freyberg wasn't allowed to disable the airfields as he wanted to do, and the Nazis had absolute and total air superiority - why do you think the RAF were later dubbed 'Rare As Fairies' by the NZ troops? The Allies were being constantly dive bombed. And once The Kiwis had conceded Maleme (though Charles Upham VC & Bar seemingly tried to recapture it almost singlehandedly), the German's total air superiority was bound to be a telling factor; the battle could only go one way.

The Commonwealth troops in their evacuation ships were then besieged by the Luftwaffe all the way back to Alexandria. The Royal Navy suffered appallingly in the Med' through Stuka divebombing.

Still, the (unsuccessful) defence of Crete prevented Hitler from using his paratroopers as actual airborne troops ever again - which saved Malta, and therefore the Med', and therefore the British Army east of Gibraltar.

So, I don't think you can say Crete was primarily an example of bad (on-the-ground) leadership. It was an example of bad logistical planning (The allies had No Air Cover and hardly any tanks), and showed the need for modern weapons, better planned and co-ordinated defences, and modern comms (Freyberg's staff had No Radios). Above all, it demonstrated the need for air power. Beevor seems to forget this.

For my money, Beevor's book on Crete was no better than Alan Clarke's - and Beevor (writing in the 1990s) had the benefit of disclosure of Ultra secrets, whereas Clarke (writing in the '60s) did not. It is an interesting read, but it is not "the best book on Crete we have", not by a long stretch.